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REFLECTIONS ON GLOBALIZATION 
AGEING AND GLOBALIZATION: A GLOBAL ANALYSIS 
Jason L. Powell and Hafiz T. A. Khan 
As we look forward into the mid-21st century, the demographers forecast dra-
matic increases in cultural diversity in the general population of the globe, 
which will also be reflected in increasing ageing populations. Globalization is 
a complex phenomenon which includes increasing human interconnectedness 
facilitated by new information technologies and huge volumes of trade, capi-
tal, people, and cultures flowing across national borders, and an evermore 
integrated global economy. Globalization can be experienced as structural 
forces impinging on our daily lives, as the creation of new spaces and inter-
connection between locales and also as ideological resources (Chen and 
Powell 2012). A key issue is the relationship between globalization and popu-
lation ageing which has possibilities and consequences for social change 
across the globe. 
Keywords: population ageing, globalization, economic crisis, health. 
Introduction 
Population ageing is considered to be an important aspect in this age of globalization as 
it has huge impacts on diverse areas of our daily life. Past literature has highlighted the 
impact of ageing on various levels at societal and economic of a country, however, little 
is known about the interconnectedness between the ageing and globalization. This pa-
per therefore aims at providing an exploratory investigation on the linkages between 
globalization and ageing of populations across the world.  
Discussion on Ageing and Globalization 
While the highest proportions of older people are currently found in more developed 
countries, the most rapid growth of this age group is actually occurring in the less de-
veloped world (McDaniel and Zimmer 2013). Between 2006 and 2030, the increasing 
number of older people in less developed countries is projected to grow by 140 % as 
compared to an increase of 51 % in more developed countries (Krug 2002). A key fea-
ture of population ageing is the progressive ageing of the older population itself. Over 
time, more older people survive to even more advanced ages (Chen and Powell 2012). 
The forecast rise in the number of older people aged 75+ over the next two decades will 
lead to an expansion of demand for health, housing accommodation and pensions for 
ageing populations and is thus of crucial importance for governments, policy makers, 
planners, and researchers in all nation states (McDaniel and Zimmer 2013). On a global 
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scale, the population aged 85 and over is projected to increase by 151 % between 2005 
and 2030, compared to a 104 % increase for the population aged 65 and over and  
a 21 % increase for the population under 65 (Bengston and Lowenstein 2004).  
The most striking increase will occur in Japan: by 2030, nearly 24 % of all older Japa-
nese are expected to be at least 85 years old. As life expectancy increases and people 
aged 85 and over increase in number, four-generation families may become more com-
mon (Chen and Powell 2012). 
In advanced capitalist or First World countries fertility decline that started in the 
early 1900s have resulted in current fertility levels below the population replacement 
rate of two live births per woman. Perhaps, the most surprising demographic develop-
ment of the past two decades has been the pace of fertility decline in many less devel-
oped countries (Giddens 1993). In 2006, for example, the total fertility rate (TFR) was 
at or below the replacement rate in 44 less developed countries (Cook and Powell 
2007). Most of the more developed nations have had decades to adjust to this change in 
age structure. For example, it took more than a century for France's population aged 65 
and over to increase from 7 % to 14 % of the total population. In contrast, many less 
developed or Third World countries are experiencing rapid increases in the number and 
percentage of older people, often within a single generation. The same demographic 
ageing process that unfolded over more than a century in France will occur in two dec-
ades in Brazil (OECD 2007). In response to this compression of ageing, institutions 
must adapt quickly to accommodate a new age structure. Some less developed nations 
will be forced to confront issues, such as social support and the allocation of resources 
across generations, without accompanying economic growth that characterized the ex-
perience of ageing societies in the West. In other words, some countries ‘may grow old 
before they grow rich’ (Cook and Powell 2010: 77).  
Globalization has also produced a distinctive stage in the social history of popula-
tion ageing, with a growing tension between nation state-based solutions (and anxieties) 
about growing old and those formulated by global institutions (Heshmati and Lee 
2010). Globalization, defined here as the process, whereby nation-states are influenced 
(and sometimes undermined) by transnational actors (Powell 2005), has become an in-
fluential force in shaping responses to population ageing. Growing old has itself be-
come relocated within a transnational context with international organizations (such as 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) and cross-border migrations, creat-
ing new conditions and environments for older people (Phillipson 2003).  
Ageing can no longer be viewed just as a ‘national’ problem but the one that affects 
transnational agencies and communities. Local or national interpretations of ageing had 
some meaning in the world where states were in control of their own destiny (Estes et al. 
2003). They also carried force where social policies were being designed with the aim or 
aspiration of levelling inequalities, and where citizenship was still largely a national affair 
(and where there was some degree of confidence over what constituted ‘national bor-
ders’). The crisis affecting each of these areas, largely set in motion by different aspects 
of globalization, is now posing acute challenges for understanding ‘global ageing’ in 
the twenty-first century.  
If these examples illustrate the complexity and impact of global ageing – then, it 
may be pertinent to highlight how globalization is impacting more specifically across 
different continents around the world.  
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Since the turn of the last century, the life expectancy of people born in North America 
has increased by approximately 25 years and the proportion of persons 65 years or 
older has increased from 4 % to over 13 % (Estes and Associates 2001). By 2030, one 
in five individuals in the USA is expected to be 65 years or older and people aged 85 
and older make up the fastest growing segment of the population. In 2000, there were 
34 million people aged 65 or older in the United States that represented 13 % of  
the overall population (Estes and Associates 2001). By 2030, there will be 70 million 
people over 65 in the United States, more than twice their number in 2000. 31 million 
people, or 12 % of the total population, are aged 65 and older. In another 35 years, the 
elderly population should double again. The ageing population is not only growing rap-
idly, but it is also getting older:  
In 1990, less than one in ten elderly persons was age 85 or older. By 2045, the 
oldest old will be one in five. Increasing longevity and the steady movement of 
baby boomers into the oldest age group will drive this trend (Longino 1994: 856). 
The percentage of the oldest old will vary considerably from country to country.  
In the United States, for example, the oldest old accounted for 14 % of all older people in 
2005. By 2030, this percentage is unlikely to change because the ageing baby boom 
generation will continue to enter the ranks of the 65-and-over population (Bengston and 
Lowenstein 2004). This is obviously causing much concern among policy-makers but 
Longino (1994), for instance, believes that thanks to better health care service, chang-
ing living arrangements and improved assistive devices, the future may not be as nega-
tive as we think when we consider an ageing population. Ageing is, therefore, seen as a 
triumph of the 21st century (UNFPA 2012). 
Estimates suggest that there is an increasing trend of share portion of older people 
(60+ years) globally (UNFPA 2012; McDaniel and Zimmer 2013) and a significant 
variation exists between developed and developing countries in terms of responding 
policy actions to emerging issues particularly in bearing the cost of care for the elderly 
persons (Khan et al. 2013). In many countries of the world the progress of solving 
global ageing issues has become slower or somehow impossible due to the 2008–2012 
global financial crises. Recent study shows that the global economic crisis has exacer-
bated the financial pressure in every country to ensure both the economic security and 
the access to health care in old age (UNFPA 2012). 
It will be different, however, not least because people currently divorced constitute 
a small proportion of older populations. This will soon change in many countries as 
younger populations with higher divorce and separation rates age. In the United States, for 
example, 9 % of the 65-and-over population is divorced or separated compared to 17 % of 
people aged 55 to 64 and 18 % of people aged 45 to 54 (Manton and Gu 2001). This trend 
has gender-specific implications: in all probability non-married women are less likely than 
non-married men to have accumulated assets and pension wealth for use in older age, 
while older men are less likely to form and maintain supportive social networks. 
Shoring up public pensions is hardly the only path the nations of North and South 
America are exploring. In many countries, privately managed saving accounts have 
been strongly advocated (Estes and Associates 2001). Two decades ago, nearly every 
South American nation had pay-as-you-go systems similar to the U.S. Social Security 
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system. Some granted civil servants retiring in their 50s full salaries for life. Widening 
budget deficits changed that. In 1981, Chile replaced its public system with retirement 
accounts funded by worker contributions and managed by private firms. The World 
Bank encouraged 11 other Latin nations to introduce similar features. For example, in 
Chile the government addressed its fiscal budget deficit by mobilizing $49 billion of 
pension-fund assets that make it easier for companies and corporations to fund invest-
ments in the local currency with bond offerings, and most workers have some retire-
ment benefits from this (OECD 2007). At the same time, the downside has been those 
people who cannot afford a private pension and have been left to a low state pension 
which has intensified poverty (Estes and Associates 2001); an enduring feature of all 
nation states in America. For the future, there is no safety guarantee that private pen-
sion schemes are protected and pay out for people who invest their savings in such pro-
vision. In the deregulated U.S. pension system, the issue of corporate crime has high-
lighted the continuing problem of private pension provision. For example, it can be 
clearly seen with the energy corporation of Enron's embezzlement of billions of dollars 
of employees private pension schemes (Powell 2005). This debate amounts to a signifi-
cant global discourse about pension provision and retirement ages, but one which has 
largely excluded perspectives which might suggest an enlarged role for the state, and 
those which might question the stability and cost effectiveness of private schemes.  
The International Labour Organization (ILO) concluded that investing in financial mar-
kets is an uncertain and volatile business: that under present pension plans people may 
save up to 30 % more than they need, which would reduce their spending during their 
working life; or they may save 30 % too little – which would severely cut their spend-
ing in retirement (Phillipson 1998; Estes et. al. 2003). 
Holtzman (1997), in a paper outlining a World Bank perspective on pension re-
form, has argued for reducing state pay-as-you-go (PAYG) schemes to a minimal role 
of basic pension provision. This position has influenced both national governments and 
transnational bodies, such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), with the latter 
now conceding to the World Bank's position with their advocacy of a mean-tested first 
pension, the promotion of an extended role for individualized and capitalized private 
pensions, and the call for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) member countries to raise the age of retirement. 
There is also the impact of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) on the pension 
debate in South America. Such arguments are to create a climate of fear, inevitability 
and scientific certainty that public pension provision will fail. In so far as this strategy 
succeeds, it creates a self-fulfilling prophecy. If people believe the ‘experts’ who say 
publicly sponsored PAYG systems cannot be sustained, they are more likely to act in 
ways that mean they are unsustainable in practice. Certainly, in Europe and elsewhere, 
the state pension is an extremely popular institution. To have it removed or curtailed 
creates massive opposition. Only by demoralizing the population with the belief that it 
is demographically unsustainable has room for the private financiers been created and 
a mass pensions market formed. 
Increasingly, the social infrastructure of welfare states is being targeted as a major 
area of opportunity for global investors. The World Bank has expressed the belief that 
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the public sector is less efficient in managing new infrastructure activities and that the 
time has come for private actors to provide what were once assumed to be public ser-
vices. This view has been strongly endorsed by a variety of multinational companies, 
especially in their work with the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The WTO enforces 
more than twenty separate international agreements, using international trade tribunals 
that adjudicate disputes. Such agreements include the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), the first multilateral legally enforceable agreement covering banking, 
insurance, financial services and related areas (Estes et al. 2003). 
Asia has the fastest increase in the ageing population in the world. Kim and Lee 
(2007) claim the growing elderly population is beginning to exert pressure on the East 
Asian countries' economies. Three decades ago, major industrialized countries have be-
gun to grapple with the similar problem. With increasing drop in fertility rates, more 
East Asian economies such as Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan 
are expected to turn into ‘super-ageing societies’ by 2025 (Kim and Lee 2007). How-
ever, the magnitude of the future impact depends on the (in)ability of individual econo-
mies to resolve the demographic changes problem through increased privatization, pen-
sion reforms, migration to more productive countries and extension of retirement age. 
Like western countries, Asia will ultimately have to tackle issues related to pension re-
form and the provision of long term health care services (Cook and Powell 2010). 
For Japan, the basic statistical reality of its demographic profile is escalating. Already 
17 of every 100 of its people are over 65, and this ratio will approach 30 in 15 years. From 
2005 to 2012, Japan's workforce is projected to shrink by around 1 % every year – a pace 
that will accelerate after that. Economists fear that, besides blowing an even bigger hole in 
Japan's underfunded pension system (Cook and Powell 2010), the decline of workers and 
young families will make it harder for Japan to generate new wealth. 
The future challenge of providing for the elderly is especially urgent in the world's 
two biggest nations – India and China. Only 11 % of Indians have pensions, and they 
tend to be civil servants and the affluent. With a young population and relatively big 
families, many of the elderly population still count on their children for support. This is 
not the case in China. By 2030, there will be only two working-age people to support 
every retiree. Yet only 20 % of workers have government- or company-funded pensions 
or medical coverage (Chen and Powell 2012). However, as a counterbalance to such 
a gloomy perspective, ‘Chindia’ (China and India taken together) is currently accumu-
lating vast wealth as a result of globalization, wealth that could potentially be redi-
rected for the support of their elderly populations. 
The population structure of Western European countries has changed since the turn 
of the 20th century. Whereas in 1901, just over 6 % of the population were at or over 
current pension age (65 in the UK for men and women), this figure rose steadily to 
reach 18 % in 2001 (Powell 2005). At the same time, the population of younger people 
under age 16 fell from 35 % to 20 %. As European countries reach a relatively high 
level of population ageing, the proportion of workers tends to decline. European coun-
tries, including France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Russia, and the Ukraine, already have 
seen an absolute decline in the size of their workforce. And in countries where tax in-
creases are needed to pay for transfers to growing older populations, the tax burden 
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may discourage future workforce participation. The impact on the Nation States' gross 
domestic product will depend on increases in labor productivity and that State's ability 
to substitute capital for labor. Less developed countries can shift their economies from 
labor-intensive to capital-intensive sectors as population ageing advances. Options for 
more European nation states may be more constrained. The ‘rolling back’ of pensions 
promises is just one symptom of a shift in European history: the ‘graying of the baby-
boom generation’ (Chen and Powell 2012). The percentage of 60-year-olds and older 
are growing 1.9 % a year. This is 60 % faster than the overall global population. In 
1950 there were 12 people aged 15 to 64 to support each one of retirement age. Cur-
rently, the global average is nine. It will be only four-to-one by 2050 (McDaniel and 
Zimmer 2013). By then, the numbers of older people will outnumber children for the 
first time. Some economists fear this will lead to bankrupt pensions and lower living 
standards. It is interesting that in Germany this fear is becoming a battleground for po-
litical electioneering. For example, Germany has the highest population in Europe and 
the third oldest population in the world, which presents both critical questions on public 
finances to provide pensions and healthcare and an opportunity for innovations in the 
marketplace. Currently, ageing has started to figure prominently in political discussions 
prior to 2009 elections, as political parties vie for the elderly vote. The current Merkel 
administration has been criticized for increasing pensions while opponents talk about 
a ‘war of generations’ requiring young people to pay for taxation for elder care. 
The trend has drawn further attention across Europe, where the working-age popula-
tion declined by 0.6 % in 2010. By 2025, the number of people aged 15 to 64 is projected 
to dwindle by 10.4 % in Spain, 10.7 % in Germany and 14.8 % in Italy. But ageing is just 
as dramatic in such emerging markets as China – which is expected to have 265 million 
65-year-olds by 2020 – and Russia and the Ukraine (Cook and Powell 2007). 
Using evidence from the UK, the percentage of people of working age, that is 16–
64, will drop from 64 % in 1994 to 58 % in 2031 (Powell 2005). As the number of 
workers per pensioner decreases there will be pressure on pension provision. This is 
evident now, in such areas of pensions and long term care, the retreat of the state made 
evident in the erosion of State Earnings Related Pensions Scheme are forcing people to 
devise their own strategies for economic survival in old age (Phillipson 1998). In the 
British context that also impinges on global societies in general, private pensions are 
slowly being introduced in order to prevent the ‘burden’ of an ageing population. These 
are ways in which the State continues to rely on apocalyptic projections such as ‘demo-
graphic time bomb’ about ageing populations in order to justify cuts in public expendi-
ture (Powell 2005). Hence, the population of Great Britain, like that of other European 
countries, is ageing rapidly. There are only enough young people to fill one in three of 
the new and replacement jobs that will need to be taken up over the next decade. Older 
people take much of the responsibility for our social and civic life and for the care of 
children, the sick and the very old in the community. Yet, the gap between wealth and 
poverty, choice and the absence of choice for older people is stark and growing wider 
(Phillipson 1998). The UK government is at the time of writing seeking to promote 
a debate over what they envisage as a multi-billion pound deficit that will be found in 
care for the elderly in future. 
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Economic security, health and disability, and living conditions in old age are policy 
concerns throughout the world, but the nature of the problem differs considerably from 
continent to continent and between and within countries – especially within Africa.  
In Africa older people make up a relatively small fraction of the total population, 
and traditionally their main source of support has been the household and family, sup-
plemented in many cases by other informal mechanisms, such as kinship networks  
and mutual aid societies. In 2005, Nigeria ranked among the top 30 countries in the 
world on the basis of the size of its population aged 60 and over. Nigeria had the largest 
older population in sub-Saharan Africa, with over 6 million people of age 60 and over; 
South Africa had just over 3.4 million. Congo and South Africa are projected to have 
nearly 5 million older people in 2030. Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Mada-
gascar, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, and Uganda are all projected to have their older 
populations grow to over one million people by 2030 (HIV/AIDS Alliance and 
HelpAge International 2004). Very little careful empirical research has been undertaken 
on long-term trends in the welfare of older people, but there are a number of reasons to 
believe that traditional caring and social support mechanisms in Africa are under in-
creasing strain (OECD 2007). 
Located on the least developed and poorest continent, according to the World Bank 
report, the average per capita income for 25 sub-Saharan African countries was only 
130 (GDP per capita in current US$), this increased to US$ 1315 by 2011. In addition, 
reductions in fertility and child mortality have meant that, despite the huge impact of 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic across much of the region, both the absolute size and the pro-
portion of the population of age 60 and over have grown and will continue to grow over 
the next 30 years (Estes et al. 2003). 
In Africa, as in other traditional societies such as those in India or China, older 
people have traditionally been viewed in a positive light, as repositories of information 
and wisdom. And while African families are generally still intact, development and 
modernization are closely connected with social and economic changes that can weaken 
traditional social values and networks that provide care and support in later life. Africa 
has long carried a high burden of disease, including malaria and tuberculosis; today it is 
home for more than 60 % of all people living with HIV – some 25.8 million in 2005. 
The vast majority of those affected are still in their prime wage-earning years, at an age 
when, normally, they would be expected to be the main wage earners and principal 
sources of financial and material support for older people and children in their families. 
Many older people have had to deal with the loss of their own support while absorbing 
the additional responsibilities of caring for their orphaned grandchildren. Increasingly, 
then, it appears that African societies are being asked to cope with population ageing 
with neither a comprehensive formal social security system nor a well-functioning tra-
ditional care system in place (HIV/AIDS Alliance and HelpAge International 2004). 
According to the 2010 UN database, the big issue is that the majority of the world's 
population of older people aged 60 years and over (461 million) live in Asian countries 
out of world's total 865 million. There is also a remarkable difference between geo-
graphical locations. For example, in 2012, only 6 % of the population in Africa was 
60 years and over, compared with 11 % in Asia, and 22 % in Europe. By 2050, it is ex-
pected that 10 % of the population in Africa will be 60+ years, compared with 24 % in 
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Asia and 34 % in Europe (UNFPA 2012). For many countries, however, population age-
ing has been accompanied by reductions in per capita income and living standards de-
cline. Epstein (2001) notes that between 1950 and the late 1970s, life expectancy in-
creased by at least 10 % in every developing country of the world, or on average by about 
15 years. Life expectancy is generally increasing with the passage of time and varies 
largely across geographical regions (UNFPA 2012). However, at the beginning of  
the twenty-first century, life expectancy remains under fifty years in more than twenty de-
veloping countries, and in those countries since 1970 life expectancy has actually fallen 
(e.g., Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland), or has barely 
risen (e.g., Burundi, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Nigeria, Mali, Chad and Somalia)  
(UN 2013). 
The AIDS epidemic is certainly a major factor here, but development loans requir-
ing the privatization of health care have also had an impact. Epstein (2001) reports, for 
example, that by the mid-1990s the African continent was transferring four times more 
in debt repayment than on health or education. More generally, HelpAge International 
argues that:  
Older people's poverty is still not a core concern in the social, economic and 
ethical debates of our time. Their right to development is routinely denied, 
with ageing seen as a minority interest or case for special pleading. Poverty 
and social exclusion remain the main stumbling blocks to the realisation of 
the human rights of older people worldwide (HelpAge International 2000: 8). 
Conclusions 
The globalization of ageing will have dramatic effects on local, regional, and global 
economies (Powell and Chen 2012). Most significantly, financial expenditures, labor sup-
ply, and total savings will be affected. Changes in the age structures of societies also af-
fect total levels of labor force participation in society, because the likelihood that an indi-
vidual will be in the labor force varies systematically by age. Concurrently, global 
population ageing is projected to lead to lower proportions of the population in the la-
bor force in highly industrialized nations, threatening both productivity and the ability 
to support an ageing population. At the same time, as age structural transition takes 
place quite rapidly, globally there are concerns regarding the actual capacities of socie-
ties to address the challenges of ageing population, particularly during the global eco-
nomic crisis. The first thing would be to understand the extent of ageing issues with 
each society and to take steps to remedy the problems. For that we need real data on 
elderly people and their families. Countries need strong political commitments as to 
how they can utilize the resources for wellbeing of elderly by providing social pension 
or restructuring workforces in order to accommodate older persons at workplace or en-
hancing social care by encouraging intergenerational relationships within societies and 
communities (Khan et al. 2013). People should be encouraged for taking part in volun-
tary activities within the community at large. Mass campaign is necessary in order to 
educate the society that older person is not a burden instead they are contributing more 
to the family as well as to the society. We should highlight positive news on older peo-
ple. At the same time, ‘young old’ should be prepared for the life-long saving as the fu-
ture benefit system is likely to be uncertain. 
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